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Abst rac t  
The jurisdictions of Shariah Court, except with regard to Shariah Court in the Federal 
Territories which only the Parliament has the power to pass law relating to  i t ,  are 
specifically provided in the respective States' Enactments of the Administration of 
lslamic Law. The power of the States to pass and make laws relating to  Administration 
of lslamic Law, is originally conferred by Article 74 (2) of the Federal Constitution (FC) 
and further this position has been entrenched in List I1 under the Ninth Schedule to  the 
Federal Constitution (FC). However, based on the decisions of several case-law in 
Malaysia i t  is found that though the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court is clear on and 
over the said matters as conferred by the statutory provisions, yet there are certain 
enumerated matters which are still could not be decided freely and independently by 
the Shariah Court. These matters instead, have fallen into the realm of the Ordinary 
Civil Courts. It is contended that, this uncertainty would result in 'chaos' on the 
Shariah Court's jurisdiction and power to freely determine over its own matters. This 
phenomenon could shroud in uncertainty over and fetter the exclusiveness and 
entrenched jurisdictions and powers of the Shariah Court itself, which could even, 
arguably, reach the pinnacle of neglecting the significant of Article I21(1A) of the FC, 
in which, this provision has specifically ousted the Ordinary Civil Courts from 
interfering with the jurisdictions of the Shariah Court over certain exclusive matters . 
This paper wil l  highlight the issues and wil l  suggest certain measures in order to  
promote and upgrade the status and due functions of the Shariah Court in Malaysia 
Introduction 
lslam i s  the religion of the Federation of Malaysia pursuant to Article 3(1)  of the 
FC. However, based on the constitutional interpretation and case law, lslam 
only becomes the concern of the respective states, except for Federal 
Territories, in Malaysia. Only the states, through their state legislative 
assemblies are responsible to make lslamic laws. This i s  provided in item I of 
List I I  (State List) provides as follows: 
Except w i t h  respect t o  the  Federal Terr i tor ies of Kuala Lumpur 
and Labuan, lslamic law and personal and family law of persons 
professing the religion of Islam, including lslamic law re la  t ing t o  
succession, testate and intestate, bet ro tha l ,  marr iage, divorce, 
dower ,  maintenance, adopt ion, legit imacy, guardianship, gifts, 
par t i t ions and non-charitable trusts; Wakafs and the def ini t ion 
and regulat ion of chari table and religious trusts,  the 
appointment  of trustees and the  incorporation of persons in 
respect of lslamic religious and chari table endowments, 
inst i tut ions, trusts, charit ies and chari table inst i tut ions 
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(b) in its civil jurisdiction, hear and determine all actions and proceedings in 
which all parties are Muslim and which relate to  - 




vi i)  
vi i i )  
ix) 
betrothal, marriage, ... or other matters relating to the 
relationship between husband and wife; 
a disposition of, or claim to, ... the matters set out paragraph I 
above; 
the maintenance of dependants, legitimacy, or guardianship or 
custody (hadhanah) of infants; 
the division of, or claims to, harta sepencarian; 
Wills or death-bed gifts (marad-al-maut) of a deceased Muslim; 
Gifts inter-vivos, or settlements mode without adequate 
con5ideration in money or money's worth, by a Muslim; 
Wakaf or nazr; 
Division and inheritance of testate or intestate property; 
The determination of persons entitled to  share in the estate of a 
deceased Muslim or the shares to  which such persons are 
respectively entitled; or 
Other matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by 
any writ ten law; 
Similarly, the Kedah Syariah Subordinate Court, pursuant to section 10(2)(b) of 
the Kedah Enactment, possesses the jurisdictions as tha t  of  the Syariah High 
Court. The difference between the Syariah Subordinate Court and the Syariah 
High Court is that the Syariah Subordinate Court can only hear claims arising 
from the aforesaid matters involving amount or value which does not exceed 
RM 50,000.00. 
For Penan? and the Federal Territories (Kuala Lumpur), the aforesaid 
jurisdiction is respectively spelt out in  section 48(2)(b)(i)-(x) of  the 
Administration of lslamic Relisious Affairs Enactment of the  State of  Penang, 
1993 ('Penang Enactment') i n  respect of  the Penang Syariah High Court's, and 
section 46(2)(b)(i)-(x) of  the Administration of lslamic Law (Federal Territories) 
Act 1993 ('FT Act') for the Federal Territories'. In respect of  their respective 
Syariah Subordinate Courts' jurisdictions, these are stated i n  section 49(2)(b) 
and section 47(2)(b) of their respective Enactment and Act. 
Meanwhile their respective provisions on the Syariah Subordinate Courts are 
provided i n  section 49(2)(b) of the Penang Enactment, section 47(2)(b) of  the 
FT Act and section 43(2)(b) of the Selangor Enactment. 
The Applicable Law t o  t h e  Syariah Courts 
Based on the Administration of Islamic law Enactments o f  each states in  
Mataysia i t  is provided that lslamic Law (hukum syara') is the governing law of  
the Syariah Courts and i f  there is no provision in  the Enactments on a particular 
issue, the Syariah Court is duty bound to follow the lslamic Law by reference 
to, inter alia the Quran, Assunnah and opinions of the mazhabs to  settle that  
dispute. These provisions contained in  section 245(1)(2) of the Penang Syariah 
Court Civil Procedure Enactment 1999, section 130(1)(2) of the Penang Syariah 
Evidence Enactment 1996, section 25(1)(2) of the Kedah Syariah Court 
Enactment 1993, section 122(1)(2) of the Kedah lslamic Family Law Enactment 
1984, section 273(1)(2) of the Kedah Civil Procedure Enactment 1984, section 
100 of the Kedah lslamic Evidence Enactment 1990 and section 253 of the 
Selangor Syariah Civil Procedure Code 1991. 
Article 121 (1A) of the FC 
Since the inclusion of clause 1A of article 121 to the Federal Constitution 
('FC'), the Ordinary Civil Courts - courts other than the Syariah courts, shall 
have no jurisdiction to try and decide matters which fal l  within the jurisdiction 
of the Syariah Courts. The Ordinary Civil Courts shall have no jurisdiction i f  the 
parties involved are Muslims and the disputed matters are within the 
jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts. This new amendment to the FC was made 
into effect from 10 June, 1988. The rationale of having such an amendment i s  
to allow the Syariah Court to carry out its functions within the jurisdiction 
conferred by law without any interference from the Ordinary Civil Courts. 
Previously there were cases found to be within the Syariah Court's jurisdiction, 
yet they were dealt with by the Ordinary Civil Court. The effect of this 
amendment i s  to avoid in  future any conflict between the decisions of the 
Syariah Court and the Ordinary Civil Court which had occurred previously in a 
number of cases for example Myriam v  riff,^ Commissioners for Religious 
Affairs Trengganu h Ors v Tengku ~ a r i a m ~ ,  Ainan bin Mahmud v Syed Abu 
~ a k a ?  Nafsiah v Abdul ~ a j i d  , Roberts v Ummi ~a l thom'  , Boto' bint i  Taha v 
Jaafar bin ~ u h a m m a d  ,Re Syed Shaik ~ l k a f f  and in Re Alsagoff's  rust". 
' (1971) lMLJ 265. The issue on this case was whether the widow who had married to  another 
man could be given custody of her child from her previous rnarriage. The court set the decision 
of the Kathi aside on the ground of section 45(6) of the Selangor Administration of Muslim Law 
Act 1952 and the jurisdiction granted to the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) pursuant to the 
Guardianship of Infants Act 1961. 
(1969) 1 MLJ 110, where there was issue of wakaf. In the preliminary, the parties had 
consulted the Mufti to have decision on whether wakaf made by Tengku C h ~ k  for the benefit of 
his family was legal or not. The Mufti had approved such wakaf. However, the learned judge in  
that case refused to accept such fatwa but follow decision of the Privy Council in  Abdul Foto 
Mohomed lshak v Rosomoya Dhur Chowdhury (1894)L.R. 22lA 76 and Fotirnoh b in t i  Mohornad v 
Salirn bohshuwen (1952) A.C. I. 
(1939) MLJ 209. Where i t  involved a child which was birthed four months after rnarriage. 
The court held that according to section 112 of the Evidence Enactment, such a child was a 
legitimate child for the couple, even though i t  is illegitimate according to Islamic Law. 
(1969) 2 MLJ 174. Where the plaintiff in this case claimed damages against the defendant 
for having breached the contract to marry and further alleged that damages must be added as 
she had been persuaded to have sexual intercourse wi th  the defendant. Consequently, she gave 
birth. The learned judge in  this case held that the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) had power 
and jurisdiction to  hear and determine the case. This was clearly disregarded the provision of 
section 119 of the lslamic Law Administration Enactment of Melaka 1959 which provided special 
statutory provisions for betrothal among Muslims. 
' (1966) 1 MLJ 163. This case involved issue of Harta Sepencarian, which clearly within the 
jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. 
(1985) 2 MLJ 98. This case involved issue of Harta Sepencarian. 
(1923) 2 MC 38. This case involved issue of wakaf. In this case i t  was held that provision for 
estate assumed by a sound Muslim man as good and valid according to Islamic law does not 
necessarily be accepted as charitable in  the eye of the English Law. Similarly, the usages of 
'wakaf' or 'amal o l  khaira' does not necessarily show the general charitable intention. Thus 
operating wholly within the State; Malay customs; Zakat, Fitrah 
and Baitulrnal or similar Islamic religious revenue; mosques or 
any Islamic public places or worship, creation and punishment of 
offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against 
precepts of that religion, except in regard to  matters included 
in the Federal List; the constitution, organization and procedure 
of Syariah Courts, which shall have jurisdiction only over persons 
professing the religion of lslam and in respect only of ANY of the 
matters included in this paragraph, but shall not have 
jurisdiction in respect of offences except in so far as conferred 
by federal law, the control of propagating doctrines and beliefs 
among persons professing the religion of Islam; the 
determination of matters of lslamic law and doctrine and Malay 
custom '. 
As far as the Federal Government i s  concerned, i t s  duty towards Islam, in  
accord with article 3(4) of the FC i s  l imited to prevent other religion from beins 
propasated to people professing the religion of Islam. Secondly, the Yang 
Dipertuan Agong, vide oath of office, pursuant to the Fourth Schedule, solemnly 
and truly declares that he shall at all time protect the religion of  lslam and to 
hold the rule of law and order of the country. Only through these provisions 
that, the FC confers upon the Federal Government, some responsibility, 
towards defending and protectins the religion of lslam.' The actual authority to 
pass and make laws pertaining to lslam i s  the states pursuant, except for 
Federal Territories, to Article 74 (2) of  the FC, which reads: 
'Without prejudice to any power t o  make laws conferred on i t  by 
any other Article the legislature of a State may make laws w i th  
respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List (that 
is to say, the Second List set out in the Ninth Schedule) or the 
Concurrent List ' 
However, Article 74(3) qualifies the operation of section 74(2) i n  that the 
power to make laws i s  subject to conditions or restriction imposed by the FC. 
Further, Article 77 of the FC states that the legislature of a state shall have 
power to make laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in any of the 
List set out in the Ninth Schedule, provided that it i s  not being a matter of 
which Parliament has power to pass laws. Syariah Court is only entit led to 
decide matters which are specifically mentioned in  i tem I of List II (State List) 
of the Ninth Schedule to the FC above. Matters which fa l l  wi th in the Federal 
List - List 1 in  particular i tem 4 are excluded. The matters that fal l  within i tem 
4 of List 1 (Federal List) under the Ninth Schedule to the FC are as follows: 
(a) the constitution, organization, jurisdiction, remuneration, 
privileges of the officers of the court (other than Syariah 
Courts); 
See U a  Joy v M?AIs Aqama lslam Wilayah &Anor (2004) 2 MLJ, 119, Halirnatussaadiah bte HJ 
Karnaruddin v Public Services Commiss~on, Malays~a ti: Anor (1994) 3 MLJ 61 and Meor 
Atiqulrahman bin lshak dan lain-lain Iwn Fatimah bte Siti dan lain-lain (2000) 5 MLJ 375- 
(b) Jurisdiction and power of all such courts; 
(c) Remuneration and other privileges of the judges and officers 
presiding over such courts; 
(d)  Persons entitled to practise before such courts; 
(e) Subject to para ( i i ) ,  the following: 
( i )  contract, partnership, agency, other special contract, ... 
actionable wrongs, property and its transfer and hypothecation, 
except land, bona vacantia, equity and trusts, ... negotiable 
instruments, statutory declarations, arbitration, mercantile law, 
registration of businesses ...p robate and letter of administration, 
bankruptcy and insolvency, oaths and affirmations, l imitat ion, 
reciprocal enforcement of judgments and orders, the law of 
evidence; 
i i )  the matters mentioned in para ( i )  do not include lslamic 
personal law relating to  marriage, divorce, guardianship, 
maintenance, adoption, family law, gifts or succession, testate 
and intestate; 
(f)  Official secrets; corrupt practices; 
(g) Use or exhibition of coats of arms, armorial bearings, flags, 
emblems, uniforms, orders and decorations other than those 
of a State; 
(h) Creation of offences in respect of any of the matters included 
in the Federal List or dealt w i th  by federal law; 
( i )  Indemnity in respect of any of the matters in the Federal List 
or dealt wi th by federal law; 
( j )  Admiralty Jurisdiction; 
(k) Ascertainment of lslamic law and other personal laws for 
' purposes of federal law; and, 
(I) Betting and lotteries. 
Thus based on List 1 and List I I  above, the jurisdiction and power of the Syariah 
Court are limited, unlike the Ordinary Civil Court. 
States' Enactments o n  the  Administration of lslamic Law 
List II of the 9'h Schedule to the FC, specifically provide to the state (including 
the Syariah Court) the power over certain matters and in regard to the Syariah 
Court, i t s  jurisdiction and power are only applicable and enforced over lon 
Muslims. This provision i s  repeated and further clarified in the respective 
states' enactments on the administration of lslamic Law, for example, for the 
State of Kedah, pursuant to section 9(2)(b) of the Syariah Courts Enactment 
1993 ('Kedah Enactment'), the Syariah High Court can only hear and determine 
al l  actions i n  which all parties are Muslims. The relevant provisions relating to 
civi l  jurisdiction of the Syariah Court in  Kedah are stated below. 
Section 9(1)  A Syariah High Court shall have jurisdiction throughout the State 
and shall be presided over by a Syariah Judge. 
(2)  A Syariah High Court shall - 
By this contitutional amendment i t  i s  to be understood that matters that fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court as enumerated in  the above 
statutory provisions should exclusively dealt with by the Syariah Court. 
However, upon scrutiny of some cases, i t  i s  found that not al l  cases that may 
relate to the above provisions could be determined by the Syariah Court. I f  this 
event were to occur, they would then, fall back on the Ordinary Civil Courts. 
The Problem 
The underlying problem that occur, to the Syariah Court in respect o f  its right 
to freely and fully exercising i t s  jurisdiction, though guaranteed by Article 121 
(IA) of the FC, i s  the issue of lacking of certain 'power'. This 'power' i s  very 
essential to the judicial machinery, for otherwise, they would not able to 
enforce any order and decision. This can be illustrated as follows - for example, 
in  case of wakaf, where there i s  dispute in regard to the existence of  wakaf, 
the party who claims that there was actually a 'wakaf', would normally prayed 
to the court for order of declaration. Further, that would also request for an 
injunction order in  order to restrain the trespassing party from further 
occupying on the said wakaf land. However, the 'power' to grant declaratory 
order and injunction i s  only exclusively given to the High Court (ordinary civil 
court) pursuant to Specific Relief Act 1950 and Rules of High Court 1980. 
Although, wakaf i s  expressly within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court, yet as 
the prayers requested by the parties are not that within the compentence of 
the Syariah Court, Syariah Court i s  debarred from determining the case. 
The question is, i s  there any difference between jurisdiction and power? If one 
were to look .back at Article 121 (IA) of the FC, that provision only uses the 
term 'jurisdiction', not 'power'. Further question would then follow, does the 
term 'jurisdiction' also include 'power'?. The distinction between 'jurisdiction' 
and 'power' was considered in Lee Lee Chenq v Seow Penq ~wanq".  The court 
found that the meaning of the words 'jurisdiction' and 'powers' as used in  the 
Courts Ordinance 1948 were different. This was because there were different 
provisions relating to 'jurisdiction' and 'powers' in that Ordinance. The court 
explained that 'jurisdiction' was the authority of the courts to hear and decide 
disputes brought before i t .  'Powers' on the other hand were the courts' 
capacity to give effect to i t s  judgment by making or giving the order or the 
relief prayed. The court stated that although a court was given certain 
'powers', this did not mean that the court could use the 'powers' i f  i t  had no 
'jurisdiction'. If a court has 'jurisdiction' over a matter, i t  could not exceed i t s  
'power' in that matter because the terms 'jurisdiction' and 'powers' were 
distinct. 
Case-Law 
provisions made to spend the balance o f  estates for arnal al khaira (good deeds) in  Tahrim, Mekah 
and Madinah according to the discretion of the donor (wasi) was held not valid. 
l o  (1956) MLJ 244. Where i t  was held that monetary provision as gift to the poor people 
reciting Al-Quran on the graves of the deceased was not valid. This is because the court are 
bound to follow section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950 which provides that wi l l  and trust deeds 
shaU be ~nterpreted in  accordance with the En~lish law. 
l 1  (1960) 1 MLJ 1. 
To illustrate the above difficulty, the authors would like to highlight cases that 
raised this problem. The cases are: 
1) Mailis Aqama lslam Pulau pin an^ v Isa Abdul Rahman & Satu Yanq ~ a i n ; ' ~  
2) G Rethinasamy lwn Majlis Ugama Islam, Pulau Pinanq dan Satu Yang 
~ain;' 
3)  Shaik Zolkaffilv bin Shaik Natar & Ors v. Reliqious Council of Penang 
(Court of Appeal (Ordinary Civil Court));14 
4) Barkath Ali bin Abu Backer v. Anwar Kabir bin Abu Backer & 0rs;l5 
5) Abdul Shaik bin Md lbrahim v Hussein bin lbrahim;16 and, 
6) Shaik Zolkaffily bin Shaik Natar 8 Ors v. Religious Council of Penanq 
{Supreme Court (Ordinary Civi\ Court)); " 
1) Mailis Aqarna Islam Pulau Pinanq v Isa Abdul Rahman f3 Satu Yang 
~ a i n ; ~ ~  
This case came to the Supreme Court (Ordinary Civil Court) for determination 
of an appeal. In this case, the first respondent inherited from the original 
landowner a piece of land on which a mosque had been built in 1889. The 
original landowner had donated the land and the mosque as 'wakaf am'. The 
appellant proposed to demolish the mosque and on i t s  place, they intended to 
erect a building for commercial purposes. The respondents claimed in the High 
Court (Ordinary Civil Court) of Penang, inter alia: a declaration that the 
proposal of the appellant to demolish the mosque was contrary to law and 
'hukum syara'; a declaration that under 'wakaf am' the appellant had no right 
to demolish the said mosque; and an injunction to prevent the appellant or 
their agents or servants from demolishing the mosque. The appellant had made 
an application to set aside the respondents' claim. The Senior Assistant 
Registrar of  the High Court dismissed the appel\ant's application. So too was 
the appeal to the judge. The appellant further appealed to the Supreme Court 
(Ordinary Civil Court). 
The Supreme Court (Ordinary Civil Court) decided that the real order applied 
for by the respondent was a perpetual injunction. This order, according to the 
Specific Relief Act 1950, could only be granted by the High Court (ordinary civil 
court) not the Syariah court.I9 Although the relevant Syariah Court has 
l 2  (1 992) 2 MLJ 244. 
" (1993) 2 MLJ 166. 
l 4  (1 997) 3 MLJ 281. 
l 5  (1997) 4 MLJ 389. 
l 6  (1999) 5 MLJ 618. 
l 7  (2003) 3 CLJ 289. 
'' (1992) 2 MLJ 244. 
l9 Section 51(2) of the Specific Relief Act 1950 states: 
A perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing 
and upon the merits of the suit; the defendant i s  thereby perpetually enjoined 
from the assertion of a right, or from the commission of an act, which would be 
contrary to the rights of the plaintiff. 
According to the judge (Eusoff Chin SCJ) - 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, namely the jurisdiction to construe, 
interprete and determine wi l l  of a Muslim and wakaf, the Syariah Court has no 
power to grant the order prayed for. Since the Syariah Court does not have the 
required power, the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) i s  the proper forum to 
hear the application and to finally decide the case. 
2) G Rethinasamy Iwn Majlis Ugama Islam, Pulau Pinanq dan Satu Yang 
~ a i n ; ~ ~  
This i s  a High Court (Ordinary Civil  court)'^ case. In this case, the plaintiff (G 
Rethinasamy) claimed that he was the registered owner of a piece of land, 
situated a t  the North East District, Penang ('the said land'). Based on his claim, 
the first defendant (Majlis Ugama lslam Pulau Pinang) and the second 
defendant (the chairman and committee members of the Ketawai Mosque, 
Penang), through their agents and servants had verbally agreed wi th the 
plaintiff that they would transfer the cemetary covering an area of 6,200 
square foot and to demolish two temporary buildings, both were situated a t  
and erected on the said land. According to the plaintiff, both defendants had 
failed to do these. Hence, the ptaintiff applied for a declaration that he i s  s t i l l  
the registered owner of the said land and/or he i s  entit led to have fu l l  
possession on and over the land, without any interference by the defendants, 
damages, interest and vacant possession. 
The defendants in defence replied that, they agreed that the plaintiff i s  the 
registered owner o f  the said land. However, his ownership i s  l imited to the 
portion marked in blue as highlighed in the attaching map. The defendants 
denied that they have ever agreed to transfer the cemetary and to demolish 
the buildings. Further the defendants said that, originally the said land, now 
owned by the plaintiff, was actually, for about 90 years had been owned by the 
Muslims and that the portion marked green in the attaching map ('portion A') 
has been used for religious purposes together with the mosque situated 
thereon. That mosque had been built in  1866. Portion A i s  an area that has 
been used for prayers, storages and as cemetary. The defendants further said 
that portion is a wakaf land and that i t  has been vested i n  the first defendant 
(Majlis Ugama lslam Pulau Pinang) under section 105 of the Penang 
Administration of Religion of lslam Enactment 1993. Further, the defendants 
made a counter-claim that the plaintiff had been estopped from claiming that 
portion (portion A) as the usage of that portion has been so since the last 100 
years and this is well known to the plaintiff and the previous owners without 
any objections from them. The defendants too, claimed for a declaration that 
portion A is a wakaf land and that, that portion be divided and severed from 
the whole land under dispute/ the said land, for the purpose of issuance o f  
separate t i t le  and that the Penang Registrar of Land Tit le do take necessary 
actions to give effect to  the order made by the court. 
'matters involving injunction is specifically provided i n  Part Ill of the Specific 
Relief Act 1950 and the power to issue injunction order i s  only given to the High 
Court (Ordinary Civil Court). Even the session and magistrate courts are 
prohibited by section 69 and 93 of the Subordinate Court Act 1948 from issuing 
injunction order irrespective whether i t  i s  perpetual injuction or interim.' 
20 (1993) 2 MLJ 166. 
The judge - Abdul Hamid J rejected the contention that, this case could be 
determined by the Syariah Court, although portion A i s  a wakaf land. Matters 
concerning 'wakaf' i f  we were to look at  the provision in List II (State List) 
under the Ninth Schedule to the FC and the Penanq Admiriistration of Religion 
of lslam Enactment manifestly falls within the Syariah Court's jurisdiction. 
However, this provision i s  still insufficient to grant the Syariah Court exclusive 
jurisdiction and power to determine it in this case. The grounds of his Lordship 
refusal are: 
1) The plaintiff is  not a Muslim. Thus, this debars the Syariah Court from 
hearing the case pursuant to the limitation placed on i t  by the 
legislature namely, List II (State List) under the Ninth Schedule to the FC 
and section 40(3)(a) of the Penang Administration of Religion of lslam 
Enactment 1993; 
2) The issues involved in this case are namely - the effect of registration of 
t i t le under land law, issue of estoppel and order for declaration. These 
matters are not conferred to the Syariah Court for determination by any 
legislation. In fact, these are the provinces of  the High Court (Ordinary 
Civil Courts) pursuant to the National Land Code 1965, Rules of High 
Court 1980 and Specific Relief Act 1953; and, 
3) Cases previous to the one under determination, support the above 
grounds. For example Dalip Kaur v. Peqawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis 
Daerah, Bukit Mertaiam 8   nor", the Supreme Court (Ordinary Civil 
Court) finally decided that the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) and not 
the Syariah Court, had the right to hear issue relating to vesting order 
although that case involved matter which required special examination 
according to Islamic Law and in Majlis Aqama lslam Pulau Pinanq v Isa 
Abdul ~ahmanl*, the Supreme Court (Ordinary Civil Court) too decided 
that only the same courticivil Court) could hear the claim for injunction 
order, albeit the subject matter was 'wakaf'. 
3) Shaik Zolkaffily bin Shaik Natar & Ors v. Relieious Council of Penanq 
/Court of Appeal (Ordinary Civil ~ 0 u t - t ) ~ ~ ~  
This i s  a High Court (Ordinary Civil  court)'^ case. The facts of this case are as 
follows; The plaintiff claimed that they were the trustees and the beneficiaries 
of the estate of the deceased (Sheik Eusoff bin Sheik Latiff). They sought, inter 
aiia, for a declaration that some lots of land be reverted to the estate of the 
deceased, further order that vesting order be made to the plaintiffs as the 
trustees of the deceased or in the alternative damages and an injunction to 
restrain the defendants and their agents or servants from disposing, interfering 
or otherwise dealing with the lands until final disposal of the action ('the said 
relief'). The grounds of the plaintiff's claims were that the deceased had left a 
will dated 3oth December, 1892 and grant of probate of the estate of the 
deceased was extracted and granted on 22"* October, 1894 to the widow of the 
deceased, who also had died. According to the plaintiffs, the wi l l  contained the 
wish of the deceased that upon his death, his estates would be held in trust for 
(1992) 1 MLJ 7. 
2 2  (1992) 2 MLJ 244. 
2' (1 997) 3 MLJ 281. 
the benefits of his widow and his son and daughters (all were eight). Further, 
according to the will, the estate should reserve as a 'wakoff' (wakaf) during the 
21 years period from the demise of the last survivor of his children. According 
to the plaintiffs, the deceased's children all had died and the said 21 years had 
lapsed. Thus, accordingly, the plaintiffs wanted back the estates (land) and to 
hold the land as trusts. Unfortunately, the defendants(Majlis Ugama lslam Pulau 
Pinang - being the trustee of the wakaf Land in Penang, pursuant to the 
provision in  the Penang Administration of Religion of lslam Enactment 1993) 
failed to comply with their request. Thus, the plaintiffs commenced the 
present action against the defendants seeking the said relief. The defendants in 
their defence contended that, inter olio, the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) 
has no jurisdiction to try the claim and according to the Penang Administration 
of Religion of lslam Enactment 1993 (Enactment No. 7 of 1993) ('Penan2 
Enactment') all wakaf and trusts in  Penang and all mosques together with 
immovable properties erected thereon are vested in the Council (Majlis Ugama 
Islam Pulau Pinang). Secondly, by a deed of settlement No. 8411980 dated 26th 
June, 1980 the deceased had made a confession that the said land shall be 
'wakafkan' as a cemetery for the deceased, his family and for persons 
professing Islamic faith in Penang. On this, the defendants negated that the 
deceased had ever made a will. The defendants filed a summon to strike out 
the plaintiffs' statement of claim pursuant to Order 18 rule 19( l )(a) of the 
Rules of High Court 1980 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. 'The 
issue raised by the defendants was whether the High Court (Ordinary C~vi l  
Court) has the jurisdiction to try and hear issues relating to wakaf? The judge 
(Jeffry Tan, J) interposed that once the defendant had filed a conditional 
appearance, the defendants had waived any irregularities and that means they 
had submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. The judge referred 
to Tenqku Ali ibni Almarhum Sultan lsmail v Keraiaan Neqeri Te~nqqanu DaruJ 
lman24 and 10 Halsbury laws of England (4'" Ed) paragraph 718. On this premise, 
the same question resurfaced again, viz, whether the High Court (Ordinary Civil 
Court) has the jurisdiction to hear the case, which involved wakaf, a matter 
which i s  exclusively conferred to the Syariah Court? The learned judge rejected 
the argument that the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) has no jurisdiction to 
determine that case, simply because the subject matter i s  wakaf which falls 
withing the Syariah Court's jurisdiction. The judge gave his decision based on 
two grounds: 
a) There are several cases before this case which had adjudicated 
matters which in  the preliminary of the trial were thouzht to 
have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court, yet the 
High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) could s t i l l  adjudicate the same. 
The supporting cases are Ue th inasamy  v. Mailis Ugama Islam, 
Pulau Pinanq dan Satu Yanq ~ a i n $ ~  Lim Chan Senq v. Pensarah 
Jabatan Aqama lslam Pulau pinanqz6, Barkath Ali bin Abu Backer 
l4 (1994)  2 MLJ 83 
ZS (1993)  2 MLJ 166. 
26  (1996)  3 CLJ 231. 
v. Anwar Kabir bin Abu Backer & 01-s;~' and Mailis Aqama lslam 
Pulau Pinanq v. Isa Abdul Rahman & Satu Yanq ~ a i n ; ~ '  
b) The Syariah Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate this case by 
reason that there is no statutory provision granting Syariah Court 
the power to issue declaratory order, vesting order or the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate and interpret wills and deeds of 
settlement. These matters are only exclusively given to the High 
Court (Ordinary Civil Court). 
4) Barkath Ali b in  Abu Backer v. Anwar Kabir b in Abu Backer 8 ~ r s ; * ~  
The facts of this case are that, the plaintiff's mother(settlor of a trust who had 
passed away in  1989) was an Indian national domiciled i n  India. She had created 
a trust deed and appointed the plaintiff as the lawful attorney with powers to 
take possession of a l l  assets in  Malaysia, Singapore and other countries. The 
plaintiff filed an application to the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) in order to 
determine whether the assets in  Malaysia and Singapore had formed the subject 
matter of a valid and subsisting trustlwakaf or whether those assets were never 
validly transferred to the trustlwakaf and therefore only had formed part of 
the settlor's residuary estate and it should be distributed amongst her 
beneficiaries i n  accordance with Islamic law (faraid). In the trustlwakaf deed, 
the settlor declared that the trust was a 'wakaf-ul-a~lad'~ '  and stipulated that 
the trustlwakaf shall not fall within the jurisdiction of the 'wakaf board' for 
supervision. Counsel for the third defendant, relying on Article 121(1A) of the 
FC, raised a preliminary objection that only the Syariah Court has the 
jurisdiction to determine the questions raised by the plaintiff, not the High 
Court (Ordinary Civil Court) as the subject matter (wakaf) is specifically stated 
to be under the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court pursuant to List II under the 
Ninth Schedule to the FC and pursuant to the provision in  the Penang 
Administration of Religion of lslam Enactment 1993. However, the plaintiff and 
his siblings (the first and second defendants), contended otherwise, in that only 
the High Court(0rdinary Civil Court) has, not the Syariah Court. The Issue: 
Whether the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) has one? 
The court held that the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) has the jurisdiction to 
entertain the case. According to the court, the action of the plaintiffs involved 
an application for a declaratory decree and such 'decree'l 'matter' is 
undoubtedly is that of the High Court (Ordinary Civil  court)'^ pursuant to 
Specific Relief Act 1960 and Order 15 rule 16 of the Rules of the High Court 
1980. It follows that, such an application falls under the province of the High 
Court (Ordinary Civil Court) to construe and interpret the 'deeds' of the settlor 
to determine i f  there was a valid trustlwakaf. Therefore, the Syariah Court has 
no juridiction, even though it involved the question of Muslim's wil l  and wakaf. 
Clearly, in this case, the court had applied the 'remedy approach' in  construing 
2 7  (1 997) 4 MLJ 389. 
28 (1 992) 2 MLJ 244. 
2 9  (1997) 4 MLJ 389. 
Wakaf made to the benefit of the children and descendants. 
the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court and to legitimize the policy of the court 
allowing the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) to determine the case. 
5 )  Abdul Shaik b in Md lbrahim v Hussein b in  lbrahim;" 
This i s  a High Court (Ordinary Civil  court)'^ case. In this case, the issue raised - 
Whether Syariah Court could determine the subject matter even though that 
subject matter i s  expressly being provided by the States' Administration of 
lslamic Law Enactments as fallen within Syariah Court's exclusive ambit but it 
involved the application for declaratory order which relief Syariah Court has no 
power to issue?. 
In this respect the learned judge, Abdul Hamid J expressly preferred the 
'subject matter' approach rather than 'remedy approach'. 'Subject matter '  
approach means that, as long as the matter that i s  being dealt with by the 
Syariah Court i s  clearly within i t s  jurisdiction as conferred by the 
Administration of lslamic Law Enactment, even though the Syariah Court has no 
power, to issue any 'remedial' order (such as declaratory order, vesting order, 
injunction order and specific relief) the Syariah Court s t i l l  have the right and 
jurisdiction to determine that case. On the other hand, the 'remedy approach' 
means that, in order that Syariah Court to have 'full' jurisdiction over certain 
subject matter, but i f  i n  case, that subject matter involved application for 
relief or specific remedy, which no legislation has ever been passed to  grant 
Syariah Court such powers, Syariah Court i s  not allowed to determine that case. 
6) Shaik Zolkaffily b in Shaik Natar & Ors v. Reliqious Council of Penanq 
{Supreme Court (Ordinary Civil Court)); 32 
This i s  an appeal case from the Hiqh Court (Ordinary Civil Court) and Court of 
Appeal (ordinary Civil Court) - please see from - the  previous pages. The 
defendants, who dissastified with the decisions in  the High Court (Ordinary Civil 
Court), appealed to the Court of Appeal (Ordinary Civil court)". However, their 
appeal was again rejected by the Court of Appeal (Ordinary Civil Court). 
However, when the case was brought for further appeal to the Supreme Court 
(Ordinary Civil Court), the Supreme Court (Ordinary Civil Court) overruled the 
decisions made by the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) and the Court of Appeal 
(Ordinary Civil Court) to the effect that the Syariah Court does have the 
jurisdiction to  hear the matter (wakaf and Islamic wills) notwithstanding that 
there is no express provision in  the Penang Administration of Religion of Islam 
Enactment 1993 nor i s  there any specific legislations that grant the Syariah 
Court the power to issue specific relief such as declaratory order, vesting order 
or to adjudicate and interpret wills and deeds of settlement, following the ratio 
of Abdul Kadir Sulaiman, J in Md. Hakim Le-ah 
Persekutuan, . Kuala ~ u m ~ u r ' ~ .  This case emphasized the 'wider/l iberal 
approach or subject matter approach' i n  looking into the jurisdiction of the 
Syariah Court in light of List II (State List) under the Ninth Schedule to the FC, 
which gives 'inherent power and jurisdiction' to the states, which would 
- 
" (1999) 5 MLJ 618. 
" (2003) 3 CLJ 289. 
'I This had been reported in 4 MLJ (2002) 130 
l4 (1998) 1 MLJ 691. 
eventually include the Syariah Court, to invoke lslarnic Law. Further his 
Lordships also agreed with the opinion of Abdul Kadir Sulaiman J, that the 'fact 
that the plaintiffs may not have his remedy in the Syariah Court would not 
make the jurisdiction exercisable by the Ordinary Civil Court'. The Supreme 
Court (Ordinary Civil Court) rejected the 'remedy approach' as pro ounded by 
Harun Hashim SCJ in Mohamed Habibullah v Faridah bte Dato' Talib3! Whereby, 
according to Harun SCJ in this case, i f  there i s  no statutory provision granting 
the Syariah Court with powers to exercise specific relief remedies, 
notwithstanding that matter falls exclusively within the Syariah Court's purview 
such as wakaf or wills, the matter would s t i l l  be under the Ordinary Civil 
Court's jurisdiction. 
Conclusion and Suggestions 
The apex court i n  Malaysia finally decided that, i n  Shaik Zolkaffily case, the 
correct approach to be taken in interpreting the jurisdiction should be made by 
way of 'subject matter approach' not the 'remedy approach'. However, 
according to one learned legal expert36, Soon Sinqh a l l  Bikar Sinsh v Pertubuhan 
Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) ~edah~ ' ,  a case before Shaik Zolkaffily, has 
indirectly settled the issue. This case concerns the issue of conversion out of 
Islam. The appellant had applied for a declaration that he was no longer a 
Muslim from the High Court(0rdinary Civil Court) at  Kuala Lumpur. At the 
hearing of the case, the respondentldefendant raised a preliminary objection 
that, the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court) had no jurisdiction to hear the case. 
This was upheld by the learned judge. The judge relied on Dalip Kaur v. 
Peqawai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertaiam &  nor:'. In this case where the court 
found that the jurisdiction to hear matter involving renouncement of Islam falls 
exclusively on the shoulder of Syariah Court. This matter needs special 
examination according to Islamic Law. Thus, the only special forum capable and 
have the jurisdiction to determine apostasy according to Islamic Law i s  the 
Syariah Court, not the High Court (Ordinary Civil Court). By this case also, the 
judge stated that the jurisdiction to hear apostasy falls on the Syariah Court of 
the Federal Territories, even though that jurisdiction has yet been expressly 
conferred by the leyislature, yet, by way of implication, the Syariah Court 
should and must have one. 
Dissatisfied with the finding, the appellant then appealed to the Court of 
Appeal.(Ordinary Civil Court) and then to the Supreme Court (Ordinary Civil 
Court). The Court of Appeal(0rdinary Civil Court) rejected the appeal. So too 
the Supreme Court (Ordinary Civil Court). Both courts opined that, the 
jurisdiction of the Syariah Court to hear and determine apostasy case i s  by way 
-- 
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Sdn. Bhd, Kuala Lumpur, p 79. 
l7 (1999) 1 MLJ 489. 
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of implication, as there is no express provision conferring the Syariah Court 
over that matter. However, unfortunately the Supreme Court (Ordinary Civil 
Court) did not consider the 'power' of Syariah Court to grant the declaration in 
the course of it determination over the 'jurisdiction' of Syariah Court. It can be 
inferred from the judgment that the Supreme Court (Ordinary Civil Court) 
regarded the question of 'power' of Syariah Courts as a non-issue. 'The 
question that could be posed, whether when the Supreme Court (Ordinary Civil 
Court) had ascertained the 'jurisdiction', the Supreme Court too impliedly 
assumed that 'jurisdiction' would carry 'necessary' or 'inherent' power (such as 
the power to issue declaratory order and injunction order) for i ts due and 
effectual execution?. 
Finally to avoid any absurd result and difficulty following the above problem, in 
that the Syariah Court has no power to issue certain order such as - injunctive 
, relief, declaratory order and other specific relief, i t  i s  advisable that the 
legislatures (Parliament for the Federal Territories or States Legislative 
Assemblies) to pass laws conferring the Syariah Court such necessary power. 
